By the turn of the century, both scholars and public officials had begun to express concern about inequities across communities in the provision of public education. Along with the rapid industrialization of the country came a growing spatial variation in property wealth (Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, 1970) . Although residents of property-poor communities could compensate for their lack of fiscal resources by taxing themselves at a higher rate, the spatial differences in property tax base were so large that spending per pupil on public schools was in most states highly correlated with per-pupil property wealth. This pattern of spending differences led to a call for state intervention in the fi-nancing of public education. In the early years of the century, a number of states responded by providing equal per-pupil (flat) grants. This began the long history of attempts by state governments at fiscal equalization in the financing of public education. In this paper, I spell out the objectives of these fiscal equalization efforts and assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place to achieve fiscal equalization.
I then summarize what we have learned about fiscal equalization over the past two decades, and draw a number of lessons from that experience designed to serve as a guide for future policies.
Over time, two quite distinct principles of equalization have evolved, an egalitarian principle and one that focuses on equal educational opportunity.
A fiscal mechanism that achieves equal educational opportunity does so by eliminating or substantially reducing the link between the local fiscal resources available to a school district and its ability to provide public education. Equal educational opportunity is achieved if school districts have equal access to the resources necessary to provide any given amount of education. This definition focuses on the inputs into the educational process and the importance of equalizing the fiscal capacity of districts to provide equal quality education. By contrast, the egali- Vol. 47, no. 1, (March, 1994), pp. 185-97 tern, however, does not translate into a single concept of fiscal equalization. In fact, the experience of the past few decades suggests that there are a number of often inconsistent definitions of fiscal equalization, some of which may be unrelated to the efficiency and equity arguments presented above. Thus, any discussion of the effectiveness of policies to achieve equalization must start with a clear statement of the objectives. A review of policies used in the 50 states to achieve fiscal equalization makes it clear that states are pursuing a number of different objectives, all in the name of school finance equalization. In the following paragraph, I spell out what appear to be the major objectives of fiscal equalization as applied to public education. The discussion of fiscal equalization both in the literature and in public policy debates tends to focus on per-pupil expenditures on education. Expenditures would provide a good measure of actual educational services if the costs of providing any given amount of education were relatively equal across districts. As emphasized by Ladd and Yinger (1994) in their article in this issue, the relevant costs are those that reflect differences in the characteristics of local school districts or in the composition of student bodies, and are beyond the control of local school officials. Evidence exists that these costs vary dramatically across school districts (Chambers, 1978 (Chambers, , 1980 Ratcliff, Riddle, and Yinger, 1990; Wendling, 1981) . Although discussions of fiscal equalization should account for these cost differences, much of the literature and most school finance court decisions discuss the objectives of fiscal equalization in terms of per-pupil expenditures.
One possible objective of fiscal equalization is to guarantee that educational expenditures per pupil are not a function of the taxable wealth of local school districts. This objective, referred to as 187 wealth neutrality, was strongly championed as a goal for fiscal equalization in an influential book by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970) . They suggest an approach to the distribution of state aid called district power equalization (DPE). District power equalization can be achieved through the use of a variable matching rate formula, where the state matches local educational spending by providing a larger share of local spending to districts with lower levels of perpupil property wealth. A DPE formula thus provides low-wealth districts with higher matching rates (and correspondingly lower tax-prices) than high-wealth districts. In essence, the formula works by guaranteeing an equal tax base to every school district. State aid is equal to the difference between the actual revenue raised from its own tax base and the taxes that would be raised if the district had a tax base equal in size to the guaranteed base. In a pure DPE scheme, school districts with property tax bases larger than the guaranteed base would be required to return to the state all property tax revenue raised in excess of what would be raised from the guaranteed base given their chosen tax rate.4 For expository purposes, I use the term DPE formula to refer to any matching rate formula in which the matching rate is inversely related to per-pupil property wealth and in which aid is proportional to spending. In the school finance literature, DPE formulas are often called percentage equalizing or guaranteed tax base formulas.
In a well-known article, Feldstein (1975) demonstrated that under normal circumstances a DPE formula will not achieve wealth neutrality. Wealth neutrality requires that the elasticity of per-pupil spending with respect to district property wealth be equal to zero. Feldstein argues that there is no reason to believe that the tax rate choice by school dis-tricts wifl not be influenced by district wealth. He shows that for wealth neutrality to be achieved, the elasticity of tax-price with respect to wealth must be equal to minus one times the ratio of the wealth elasticity of spending to the price elasticity of spending. By definition, the DPE forrnula requires that the elasticity of tax-price to wealth equals one. Thus, a DPE formula will achieve wealth neutrality only in the case where the absolute values of the tax-price and the wealth elasticities are identical. Econometric evidence, however, suggests that wealth elasticities are generally greater than price elasticities (Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro, 'I 982.; DiPasquale, 1979) . We thus expect a positive elasticity of per-pupil education expenditures 'with respect to wealth to remain, de-'spite the distribution of state aid through a DPE formula. This means that despite the fact that lolw-wealth communities benefit from high matching rates Iwhile high-wealth (communities face low or zero matc:hing rates, spending per pupil in high-wealth communities is genlerally higher than spending in lowIwealth places. #Although a DPE formula cannot be expected to achieve wealth neutrality, it twill achieve, in its jpure form, what has <come to be #called i!aaxplayer equity. The use of a DPE: formula guarantees that if two districts choose the same property tax rate, the allocation of state aid allows them to provide equal levels of spendrng per pupil However, the use of a DPE formula does not require that any school distric:t pick a particular tax rate, and hence it does not guarantee the equalization of per-pupil spending among districts. Thus, the goal of a DPE formula is the equal treatment of taxIpayers, not the equal treatment of students.
A third possible goal of fiscal equalizatron is to guarantee that each school drstrict has the resoiurces available to provide an adequate level of public education at a reasonable local tax rate. Although the expressions adequaite and reasonable are obviously normative, the representative tax and expenditure systems of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations and the need-capac:ity gap measures developed by Bradbury et al. ('1984) use national and statewide average figures as their normative ifoundations. A state government trying to achieve this goal would provide more aid to school districts that had relatively low fiscal resources or, through no fault of their own, faced relatively high costs of providing their student population with any given level of education. This goal, which provides the foundation for the work of Lacld and Yrnger (1989), differs in two fundamental ways from the goal of taxpayer equity discussed above.' First, this approach explicitly considers jurisdictional differences in the costs of providing public services; secolnd, this approach compensates school districts for cost and resource deficiencies that exist in reaching a specrfic spendilng or servilce-level goal. Although the (achievemenit of this goal calls for more aid for school districts in the weakest fiscal condition, it does not require that recipient districts levy a minimum level of taxes or spend at an adequate level.
The fourth equalization goal is to guarantee that each school district provides an adequate level 0.f public education at a reasonable local tax rate. Thrs goal is achieved by requiring each school district to levy a property tax at a statemandated rate as a precondition for receiving state equalization aid. This is a more limlted measure of equity than wealth neutrality or taxpayer equity because it focuses on guaranteeing that each district provides an acceptable minimum level of education. The logic of 188 this approach, which can be implemented through the use of a foundation formula, arises from the premise that education is of sufficient importance for functioning in society that it should be guaranteed to all students.
The final equalization goal is one of providing all children with equal education. If the costs of education were equal everywhere, this goal could be met by mandating equal per-pupil spending everywhere within a state. To the extent that costs vary across districts, equality of education can be achieved by allowing additional spending in high-cost districts. Supporters of this egalitarian view argue that since education, like justice, provides access to a wide range of economic and social opportunities throughout our society, it should be equally available to everyone.
The easiest way to achieve equal spending is through the statewide funding of education. Although equality of spending will clearly result in wealth neutrality, it comes at the cost of destroying local control and sacrificing the efficiency gains from allowing local preferences for education to determine the level of provision. It should also be obvious that equal spending for all students is in effect an unattainable goal because those with sufficient resources always have the option to exit from the public education system. In fact, a careful econometric study by Downes and Schoeman (1993) provides evidence that a large increase in private school enrollment in California is attributable to substantial reductions in the local school district share of educational funding and limitations on spending increases by high-wealth districts, both of which were instituted in order to comply with state Supreme Court decisions in the Serrano case.6
Regardless of which equalization goal is pursued, the presumption is that equalization will be financed through state taxation. The impact of each goal on the distribution of income clearly depends, in large part, on the particular mix of state revenues used to finance equalization.
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Although there is not space in this paper to review fully the actions that states have taken over the past several decades to achieve various fiscal equalization goals, it is important to describe briefly the major role the courts have played in defining the terms of the school financing debates.
The equalization of school finance came to the center of the public agenda with the landmark ruling by the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest (1971) . The Court ruled that California's heavy reliance on the local property tax violated the state and federal constitutions because it had made children's education a function of the property wealth of the community in which they lived. In the original Serrano case, the court adopted wealth neutrality as a standard by which to judge the constitutionality of California's system of school financing. In a 1974 ruling by a trial court, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in a 1976 ruling, the court indicated that the implementation of a DPE formula would provide an acceptable remedy. One interpretation of this decision is that the court assumed (incorrectly) that a district power equalizing scheme would be successful in achieving wealth neutrality (Friedman and Wiseman, 1978) .
In a similar case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (197 l), a federal district court in Texas ruled that substantial variations in per-pupil spending as a result of differences in local property wealth were not permissible under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, on appeal, the U.S. 'The last few years have seen a new rash of school finance court cases. Judging ,from the recent decisions, state courts (are broadening their definitions of fiscal (equalization by moving beyond wealth neutrality and taxpayer equity. In recent (cases in Texas, Kentucky, and New Jerasey, the courts seern to be arguing that state constitutions require the equalization of per-pupil spending within a state.
Apparently, the equalization of fiscal resources available to school districts for the support of public education does not meet state constitutional tests. Although the specific wording differs in each state, the education clauses of state constitutions generally assert that the state government is responsible for seeing that all children receive an adequate level of education. In New Jersey, the constitution requires provision of a "thorough and efficient" education, while in Massachusetts, the constitution requires that the state "cherish" education. The problem for the courts has been to determine what level of perpupil spending is sufficiently high to satisfy these constitutional requirements. How, in other words, does one define "thorough and efficient" education? In the earlier school finance cases, courts tended to finesse this issue by attempting to guarantee all school districts equal access to fiscal resources. In the eyes of some legal scholars, the greatest strength of wealth neutrality is that it enabled courts to avoid the extremely difficult problem of actually defining a minimum level of education or of perpupil spencling that would meet constitutional standards (Clune, 1992) .
While thcl focus of the early court decisions was primarily on expenditures per pupil, in ,several recent cases, courts address issues of student performance more directly. There is also a growing recognition that equality of education, however defined, cannot be achieved unless explicit account is taken of the higher costs that are generally associated with educating children who come from poor or otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds. In Kentucky, in Rose IL Council for Better kbcation,
Inc., the c:ourt went beyond pure school financing issues and declared the entire system of public education unconstitutional.
In a recent Massachusetts decision (McDuffy 190 National Tax Journal Vol. 47, no. 1, (March, 1994), pp. 185-97 v. Secretary of Education), that state's Supreme Court specified seven specific "capabilities" that an educated child must possess. In effect, the court ruled that the state must develop a system of school finance that guarantees that all children be provided with an adequate education, where adequacy is being defined in terms of a specified set of skills.
HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE EQUALIZATION SCHEMES BEEN?
Since 1970, spurred on in part by court decisions, nearly every state has enacted school finance reform measures. A number of states enacted DPE-type formulas, while others increased the foundation level of spending associated with their existing foundation formulas.8 Finally, a few states enacted formulas that combined elements of both foundation and DPE formulas. Despite all this reform activity, there have been few across-state evaluations of the effectiveness of the various reforms in achieving their equalization goals.' One recent exception is a study by James Wyckoff (1992) that uses data from 49 states to compare withinstate variations in per-pupil expenditures in the 1979-80 and 1986-7 academic years. He concludes that intrastate public school spending inequality decreased modestly in the majority of states during this seven-year period." However, no systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of school finance reform efforts in meeting other equalization goals-wealth neutrality, taxpayer equity, and the provision of adequate education at reasonable tax rates-has been conducted.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to reach some tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of the various intergovernmental aid mechanisms by studying the experiences of individual states and by observing the actions of the courts in states where the remedies to earlier court rulings in school finance cases have been challenged. For reasons that I will spell out below, I believe that the limited available evidence suggests that, largely for political reasons, achieving school finance equalization, particularly wealth neutrality and taxpayer equity, is by and large an elusive goal. Effective legislative solutions require either massive infusions of new state tax revenue or the reallocation of state aid from some school districts to other districts. The experience in state after state has shown that the enactment of explicitly redistributive aid policies is extremely difficult."
Another reason that states are ineffective in achieving equalization goals is because the instruments they choose are frequently not consistent with their desired goals. For example, states that enact a DPE-type formula often expect the formula to result in substantial increases in per-pupil spending by low spending districts and consequently a significant equalization of spending across districts. As I will indicate below, this result has generally not been forthcoming.
Because DPE formulas were originally touted as innovative mechanisms for achieving wealth neutrality and taxpayer equity and are currently used in about one-third of the states, it is reasonable to focus on their effectiveness in meeting various equalization goals. The first thing to emphasize about DPE formulas is that in none of the states that use them are they designed to achieve complete taxpayer equity. As explained above, DPE formulas operate by providing all school districts with a guaranteed tax base. Full taxpayer equity can be achieved only if the state recovers property tax revenue from districts with tax bases larger than the guaranteed base. There are, however, no states with DPE formulas that require recovery; in fact, in most states high-wealth districts re-ceive "minimum aid." Recovery or "negative aid" has been declared unconstitutional by state courts in Wisconsin and Texas.
An alternative strategy for achieving taxIpayer equity is to set the guaranteed tax base equal to the per-puprl tax base in the richest district. In that way, every district except the richest would receive state equalizing alcl. This approach, however, is prohlbitivelq, expensive. For ex-(ample, in Wisconsin, which sets its guar#anteed tax base high enough so that last year 90 percent of all public school pupils lived in districts ,with per-pupil tax bases below the guaranteed base, the (cost of equalizatior> aid would have imore than doublecl if the guaranteed tax base had been set equal to the base in the wealthiest district (Reschovsky and Wiseman, 1993) .
,A second reason why states using DPE formulas fail to achieve full taxpayer equity is that tihey all distribute some aid In a nonequalizing fashion. As the design of newly targeted aid programs almost inevitably results in reductions in aid to some school districts, it is not surprising, given politica' realities, that most school finance systems include "hold harmless"' grants and "minimum aid" grants even for the wealthiest Iof school districts. Furthermore, equalization is only one goal of state aid to school districts. Most states also distribute categorical aid designed to achieve various other purposes. Some nonequall.zing grants are distributed to distrricts INI proportion to their population of students requiring special services. These categorical aid programs arle after jus#tified as a means of compensating local school districts for the costs of satisfying state or federal mandates, especiallly when the mandates relate to state rathler than local district objectives.
Although DPE formulas do not achieve full taxpayer equity, it is still reasonable to ask how effective they have been in weakening the link between district property wealth and the ability to provide public education. Because the purpose of CI DPE formula is to guarantee that all school districts choosing any given property tax rate will be able to spend thtl same amount per pupil, a simple measure of the formula's effectiveness IS to calculate the ratio of each district's per-pupil spending to its property tax rate and to compare the distribution of tlhese spending-effort ratios across dl:,tricts, with and without the receipt of equalizing aid. By definition, full taxpayer equity is achieved when all districts have identical spending-effort ratios equal to the per-pupil guaranteed tax base. I2 In a study of school finance in Wisconsin, Reschovsky and Wiseman (1994) demonstrate that the st,ate's DPE formula &ieves a substantial amount of taxpayer equity by reducing the coefflcient of variation of spending-effort ratwos by 59 percent.13 Although comparable analyses have not been published for other states, the fac.t that Wisconsin's formula employs a high guaranteed tax base suggests that few, if any, other states could achieve greater equalization (as measured by the distribution of spending-effort ratios) than Wisconsin.
Although1 DPE formulas are not explicitly designed to equa I ize spending across districts, it appears that much of their appeal is based on the expectation by many legislators that the formulas will substantially reduce disparities in perpupil spending by stimulating increased spending bly low-wealth districts. Because DPE formulas provide larger reductions in tax-prices to low-wealth districts, per-pupil spending by low-wealth districts would be expected to inc:rease relative to spending in high-wealth districts as long as price elasticities of demand for educ&ion are not highly inelastic.
It appears, however, that the use of DPE formulas has not eliminated low spending by low-wealth districts. As mentioned previously, courts in both New Jersey and in Texas have declared the remedies from previous court challenges inadequate, because per-pupil spending remains very low relative to spending levels in high-wealth districts. There are several possible reasons why DPE formulas have proved to be less than fully effective mechanisms for raising per-pupil spending levels in low-wealth districts. First, if price elasticities of education spending are sufficiently low, DPE formulas will reduce the variance across districts in property tax rates but do little to reduce the variation in per-pupil spending or increase the spending levels of low-wealth districts. Although the appropriate empirical analysis has not been conducted, it is possible that both price and income elasticities rise with district wealth. If low-wealth districts have particularly low price and income elasticities, DPE formulas (and foundation formulas that do not mandate a minimum local tax rate) will be ineffective in increasing spending levels by low-wealth districts. It should be emphasized, however, that one of the appeals of DPE formulas is that they allow local (parental) control over per-pupil spending levels while providing a substantial incentive for low-wealth districts to increase educational spending.
Second, although most existing estimates of price and income elasticities are based on cross-sectional data, the success of grant programs tends to be assessed by looking at changes in the distribution of per-pupil spending over time. Although hard evidence is not easy to find, it appears that grant formulas in a number of states are operating in an economic environment where a number of elements are working at cross purposes to the achievement of greater equity. For example, if central city property values are declining or growing relatively slowly, and if the state equalizing aid budget does not grow fast enough to compensate for the disequalizing pattern of property value growth, the revenue available for school may actually decline in central cities relative to their faster growing suburbs. l4 The fiscal situation of the cities can be further weakened if cities simultaneously experience cost increases attributable to a growth in enrollment of students from disadvantaged backgrounds.15
Finally, it should be emphasized that even if a district's spending per pupil has remained low In spite of receiving substantial amounts of aid, this does not necessarily imply that the aid has been used primarily to reduce property taxes. Between 1980 and 1988 the average starting salary of new, inexperienced public school teachers grew by 17 percent in constant dollars.'6 As long as low-wealth districts are forced to raise teacher salaries in order to attract new teachers, many low-wealth districts may well have used additional aid to finance higher teacher salaries without being able to increase their spending per pupil relative to spending in higher-wealth districts. The resulting inability of many school districts to reduce property tax rates may help explain recent statewide efforts, most notably in Michigan, to limit school property taxes.
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY
Probably because there are 50 different systems of school finance in the United States, the literature includes little comprehensive analysis of the impact of the past two decades of school finance reform. Nevertheless, despite the risk of overgeneralizing, I would like to suggest four lessons that can be learned from recent attempts to achieve fiscal equal-ization in the financing of public education.
First, in some states, district power equalizing or guaranteed tax base formulas are reasonably effective mechanisms for achieving taxpayer equity, which is attained when the allocations of aid allow all school districts choosing the same property tax rate to provide equal levels of speinding per pupil regardless of the size of their tax bases. However, for the reasons suggested in the previous section, these mechanisms are not very effective in guaranteeing that all school districts within a state spend enough money per pupil to provide all pupils with an adequate education.
Second, attempts tlo equalize per-pupil spending across school districts are illadvised and are likely to prove unsucc:essful. Because raising spending levels to equal those in the highest spending districts would take vast amounts of new state tax revenue, the only politically viable vvay to achieve equality of per-pupil spending across districts is to place a cap on spending or on spending increases by high-spenlding districts. Although such a strategy may be acceptable to the courts, it will ultimately fail. As indicated previously, evidence from California shows that if the public schools do not proz/ide the education parents want for their children, those who can affford it will enroll their children in private schools (Downes and Schoeman, 'I 993). Furthermore, stateimposed restrictions on public school spending will1 undoubtedly increase the appeal of publicly funded education vouchers. Although1 a discussion of school choice is beyond the scope of this paper, it is certainly possible that the imposition of a universal voucher system will result in substantially less equity than currently exists in most states. Finally, the insistence by the courts that per-pupil spending be equalized across all school districts may in some states lead to attempts to amend the education clauses of state constitutions, thereby rernoving the judicial u,nderpinr-ring for fiscal equality. In fact, shortly after the New Jersey legislature passed legislation that reduced aid to wealthy districts and placed restrictions on their spending, a group of suburban legislators introduced a constitutional1 amendment to replace the "thorough1 and efficient" education clause with olne that would limit the state's educational funding obligatIlons (Center for Educational Policy Analysis, 1 9913).17
The third lesson is that while full state funding of education can achieve equality of per-pupil spendlng and thereby perfect wealth neutrality, it comes at the cost of losing all loc:aI discretion over the level of per-pupil spending. Evidence from California suggests that as decisions about education spending levels move from local school boards to the state legrslature, political support for public education is reduced (Fischel, 1989 , Prcus, 1991 . California'sS per-pupil spending oln public education went from being one of the hilghest in the nation in the late 1960s to being among the bottom third in the early 1990s.
Helen Ladcl and John Yinger (1994) emphasize in their paper in this issue that no matter how fiscal equalization is defined, grant formulas should account for differences across jurisdictions both in resources and in the costs of providing public servI,ces. The final lesson from the experiences of the past two decades is that the failure in most states to adjust state aid formulas adequately to account for the higher costs of educating children frorn disadvantaged backgrounds has perpetluated disparities in educational quality and created serious deficiencies In the education provided to 194 some children, particularly those residing in many of the nation's largest cities.18 I conclude that by far the most compelling equalization goal is one that requires state governments to guarantee that all children are provided with an adequate education without placing an unreasonably high property tax burden on residents. This goal can be achieved by using a cost-adjusted foundation formula, where the foundation spending level is adjusted by a cost index reflecting the costs of providing education services that are beyond the control of local school officials, and where each school district is required to levy a minimum tax rate. In order to guarantee that districts continue over time to spend sufficient resources to ensure a quality education for all children, the foundation spending level must be indexed for inflation.
By and large, the attention paid by school finance reformers to taxpayer equity is misguided. With limited fiscal resources in the public sector, we should concentrate our efforts on achieving student-based rather than taxpayer-based equity. The efficiency and equity justifications for state and federal involvement in the financing of public education are consistent with a scheme that guarantees that resources will be made available to provide all children with an education adequate to function effectively in our economy. The justification for other equity goals is on weaker grounds. Thus, it may be appropriate either to encourage or to compel districts providing low levels of education to increase the amount and/or quality of education they provide.
In practice, no states require rich districts to contribute "negative aid" to state coffers.
Ladd and Yinger (1994) describe a formula to achieve this goal.
The passage of Proposition 13, California's property tax limitation initiative, also contributed to the increased role state funding plays in the financing of education.
The two states that do not constitutionally mandate the provision of education are Mississippi and South Carolina. In both states, education had been constitutionally mandated, but the state constitutions were amended after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.
Foundation
formulas provide each school district with a per-pupil grant equal to the difference between the state-specified "foundation" level of spending and what the local school district can raise by applying a statespecified "foundation" tax rate to its property tax base. Districts that can raise amounts in excess of the foundation receive no aid through the foundation formula. Most states require that local school districts must levy the foundation tax rate as a condition for receiving aid. A study by Stephen Carroll and Rolla Park (1983) local school districts for a portion of the extra costs of providing education to various "special needs" students. This approach to "costs" tends to create substantial inefficiencies, because local districts have an incentive 10 classify as many students as possible as "spelcial needs" students.
Furthermore, lo the extent that the allocation of state categorical aid is related to spending on programs for special needs students, districts have no incentive 'to operate these programs efficiently.
